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Better Safe than Sorry: How Strong Voter 
Identification Laws Can Protect Louisianans Against 
the Double-Sided Coin of Voter Disenfranchisement  
Voting in the names of the dead, and the nonexistent, and the 
too-mentally-impaired to function, cancels out the votes of citizens 
who are exercising their rights—that’s suppression by any light. If 
you doubt it exists, I don’t; I’ve heard the peddlers of these ballots 
brag about it, I’ve been asked to provide the funds for it, and I am 
confident it has changed at least a few close local election results.1 
 
- Congressman Artur Davis  
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 2000 presidential election, voter fraud has earned a 
permanent spot in the political discourse.2 Some claim the problem 
is nonexistent,3 while others point to history4 and criminal 
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 1. Artur Davis, I Should Have Supported Voter ID Law, RECOVERING 
POLITICIAN (Oct. 21, 2011), http://therecoveringpolitician.com/contributors 
/adavis/artur-davis-i-should-have-supported-voter-id-law [http://perma.cc/QD8V-
LAHE] (archived Apr. 5, 2014). The Honorable Artur Davis is a former U.S. 
congressman from Alabama’s 7th Congressional District. 
 2. See John Harwood, Fixing the Electoral System: Lessons From States 
Hold Hope for Reform, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2001, at A1; Randall Forsyth, 
Crucial Choice, BARRON’S, Nov. 1, 2004; Laurence Hammack, Appalachia’s Ex-
Mayor Convicted Of 243 Felonies, ROANOKE TIMES (Dec. 1, 2006), 
http://ww2.roanoke.com/politics/fraud/wb/93904 [http://perma.cc/T455-DQM8] 
(archived Apr. 5, 2014); Kenneth R. Bazinet, Both Sides Target Voter Fraud, 
Abuse, DAILY NEWS WASH. BUREAU (Nov. 02, 2008), http://www.nydailynews 
.com/news/politics/sides-target-voter-fraud-abuse-army-lawyers-article-1.333750 
[http://perma.cc/PS9G-KHD7] (archived Apr. 5, 2014). 
 3. See John Wasik, Voter Fraud: A Massive, Anti-Democratic Deception, 
FORBES (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2012/11/06/voter-
fraud-a-massive-anti-democratic-deception/ [http://perma.cc/5WDA-5LLE]  
(archived Apr. 5, 2014). 
 4. See Publius, Securing the Integrity of American Elections: The Need for 
Change, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277, 278–79 (2005) (reviewing the allegations of 
Lyndon Johnson’s “famed theft of his 1948 U.S. Senate Democratic primary with 
Ballot Box 13” and Mayor Daly’s “long-rumored stuffing of ballots in Chicago on 
behalf of John Kennedy”); Matthew Haye Brown, Democrat Withdraws from 1st 
District Congressional Race After Allegations She Voted in Two States, BALT. 
SUN (Sept. 14, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-09-14/news/bs-md-
wendy-rosen-withdraws-20120910_1_general-election-voter-fraud-vote-on-local- 
issues [http://perma.cc/4H22-XSC8] (archived Apr. 5, 2014) (voting records show 
that Rosen participated in both the 2006 general election and the 2008 primary 
election in Florida and Maryland). 
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convictions to bolster their calls for reform.5 One reform sweeping 
through the states is an effort to strengthen voter identification 
laws.6 The strongest of these laws requires voters to show valid 
photo identification before voting.7 The theory behind these laws is 
that many in-person voter fraud attempts will be thwarted if a voter 
is required to prove his or her identity by standing directly in front 
of the poll worker and showing an identification that matches the 
information in the voting registry.8 These strict measures have 
attracted vocal proponents who stress that they are commonsense 
solutions to all types of in-person voter fraud9 and vocal opponents 
who decry the efforts as thinly veiled attempts to disenfranchise 
voters.10  
The issue of disenfranchisement is a double-sided coin because 
both sides of the debate can make a case for disenfranchisement.11 
On one side of the coin, turning a voter away from the polls for lack 
of identification directly disenfranchises that voter of his or her right 
to vote. But on the other side of the coin, “[e]very vote that is stolen 
through fraud disenfranchises a voter who has cast a legitimate 
ballot.”12 Thus, protecting the fundamental right to vote requires a 
balancing of both of these concerns.13 Using an honor system to 
identify voters at the polls gives the broadest protection against 
direct disenfranchisement—that of erroneously turning away 
eligible voters—but the honor system allows individuals to commit 
                                                                                                             
 5. See Thomas Patterson, They Say Voter Fraud Doesn’t Exist. They’re 
Wrong., E. VALLEY TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.eastvalleytribune.com 
/opinion/columnists/article_18c26d8c-17ee-11e2-b85c-0019bb2963f4.html [http: 
//perma.cc/9DBR-CBQK] (archived Apr. 5, 2014) (noting that there have been 
177 convictions to date for voter fraud in connection with Al Franken’s 2008 
Minnesota Senate victory over Norm Coleman, which he won by only 312 votes, 
and the conviction of NAACP official Lessadolla Sowers for massive voter fraud 
in Mississippi). 
 6. See Voter ID: State Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 
2, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-
id.aspx [http://perma.cc/7S2R-45KS] (archived Apr. 5, 2014). 
 7. See id.; discussion infra Part III. 
 8. H.R. REP. NO. 106-666 at 1 (2006) (“Presenting photo identification when 
voting provides a simple and effective method for election officials to confirm 
identity and eligibility.”). 
 9. See supra note 2. 
 10. See supra note 3. 
 11. Publius, supra note 4, at 278 (“Every vote that is stolen through fraud 
disenfranchises a voter who has cast a legitimate ballot in the same way that an 
individual who is eligible to vote is disenfranchised when he is kept out of a poll 
or is somehow otherwise prevented from casting a ballot.”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); 
Michelle L. Robertson, Election Fraud—Winning at All Costs: Election Fraud in 
the Third Circuit Marks v. Stinson, 40 VILL. L. REV. 869, 923 n.1 (1995). 
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in-person voter fraud more easily.14 Conversely, an absolute photo 
identification requirement threatens a voter’s right to cast a ballot by 
imposing an additional registration requirement, but it is the 
broadest protection of the interest of an eligible voter to ensure that 
by catching illegally cast votes before they disappear into the ballot 
box, his or her vote is not diluted.15 Clearly, legislatures must find a 
solution lying somewhere between an honor system and an absolute 
photo identification requirement to protect both interests. 
The debate over the constitutionality of strict voter identification 
laws has wound its way through state legislatures and into 
courtrooms.16 For example, in 2005, Indiana passed a strict voter 
identification law that requires every voter who casts a ballot on 
election day to prove his or her identity with photo identification.17 
This law was quickly challenged on federal constitutional grounds.18 
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Supreme Court 
upheld the law, holding it did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.19 Having suffered defeat of their 
challenge, opponents of the law then refocused their attention on 
state constitutional limits. In League of Women Voters of Indiana, 
Inc. v. Rokita, a different organization brought suit claiming the 
same law violated the right to vote and equal protection under 
Indiana’s constitution.20 Indiana’s voter identification law again 
withstood the challenge.21 Because the question of federal 
constitutionality is settled for now, the inquiries thus turn to state 
constitutions, questioning which states, if any, offer equal protection 
rights greater than the U.S. Constitution and if that expanded 
protection precludes a state from mandating that voters produce 
valid photo identifications at the polls. 
                                                                                                             
 14. Polling places are the last line of defense to keep people “from taking 
advantage of the ‘opportunities to vote in the name of someone whom they can 
safely predict will not show up at the polls to challenge them.’” Samuel P. 
Langholz, Note, Fashioning A Constitutional Voter-Identification Requirement, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 731, 744 (2008).  
 15. Since voter identification requirements make in-person “voting frauds 
practically impossible,” an eligible voter’s vote will not be cancelled out by 
unauthorized voters. Id.  
 16. Id. at 733.  
 17. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185 (2008). 
 18. The Indiana Democratic Party initiated suit only a year after its 
enactment. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006), 
aff’d sub nom. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 
2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 19. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 949. 
 20. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 771 
(Ind. 2010). 
 21. Id. 
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This Comment examines how Indiana’s strict voter 
identification law strikes the appropriate balance between the 
constitutional protection of the right to vote and the State’s valid 
interest in securing a fair electoral process. It then explores 
Louisiana’s constitution and jurisprudence to show that Louisiana 
can sustain an appropriately balanced strict photo identification 
law.22 Part I overviews the different types of voter identification 
laws in the United States. Part II investigates the scope of the 
problem of voter fraud and how current federal legislation may, in 
part, exacerbate the problem. Part III briefly outlines the U.S. 
Supreme Court and Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis of the Indiana 
law. Part IV applies the Louisiana constitutional analysis of the right 
to vote and the right to equal protection to an Indiana-style law. 
Finally, Part V discusses how new legislation, if enacted to replace 
Louisiana’s current voter identification laws, should be shaped to 
strike the correct balance and ultimately be sustained under 
Louisiana’s constitution. In a growing and advancing democracy, 
voting remains a right that is most fundamental. The protection of 
this sacred right should not remain stagnant but rather should grow 
and advance to meet the needs of a modern democracy.  
I. OVERVIEW OF VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The National Conference of State Legislatures classifies states 
into four categories based on their voter identification laws.23 These 
categories are: (1) states that require no independent form of 
identification to vote,24 (2) states that require non-photo identification 
to vote,25 (3) states that require photo identification but allow a person 
to cast a ballot without presenting one in many instances, and (4) 
states that strictly require photo identification in order to cast a 
ballot.26 To fully understand the debate, one must first understand the 
distinctions in the law. 
A. Non-Strict, Non-Photo Identification 
State identification programs that fall into the first category 
operate exactly as they sound—a poll worker asks a voter for his or 
                                                                                                             
 22. This Comment does not analyze whether a strict voter law would be 
upheld in Louisiana by the Justice Department as part of the 1964 Voter’s Rights 
Act. 
 23. Voter ID: State Requirements, supra note 6. 
 24. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/17-9 (West 2010). 
 25. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-643 (Westlaw 2014).  
 26. Voter ID: State Requirements, supra note 6. 
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her name, and if that name appears in the voting registry, the voter is 
given a ballot.27 Illinois is one example. Under the Illinois Election 
Code, “[a]ny person desiring to vote shall give his name and, if 
required to do so, his residence to the judges of election.”28 The 
judge then repeats this information out loud in a “distinct tone of 
voice, clear, and audible” and checks the register to make sure the 
information matches a voter in the registry.29 If the information 
matches the registry, the person is given a ballot and allowed to 
vote.30  
B. Strict Non-Photo Identification 
The second categorization encompasses state programs that 
require the voter to show some independent form of identification to 
corroborate his or her identity but not necessarily one with a photo.31 
Virginia is one such state.32 According to the Virginia Code, an 
election officer must verify that the person present is “a qualified 
voter before admitting him to the voting booth and furnishing an 
official ballot to him.”33 In Virginia, the election officer must ask the 
voter his or her name and address and repeat them out loud.34 The 
officer then must ask the voter to provide a single form of 
identification, including a registration card, social security card, 
“valid Virginia driver’s license, . . . concealed handgun permit,” any 
identification issued by a Virginia state agency, a student 
identification from a Virginia university, an employee card with a 
photo, “or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, 
government check, or a paycheck that shows the name and address 
of the voter.”35 Therefore, a photo identification is accepted but is 
not required to vote.  
C. Non-Strict Photo Identification 
The law currently enforced in Louisiana is one example of the 
third category of voter identification laws—those that have a non-
strict photo identification requirement.36 When a Louisiana voter 
                                                                                                             
 27. See also 10 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/17-9. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Voter ID: State Requirements, supra note 6. 
 32. Id.  
 33. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-643 (Westlaw 2014). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Voter ID: State Requirements, supra note 6. 
1232 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
goes to the polls, he or she must identify him or herself to the poll 
worker and list his or her address.37 The information provided by the 
voter must then be stated out loud by the poll worker in front of 
bystanders.38 Next, the voter must present “a Louisiana driver’s 
license, a Louisiana special identification card . . . or other generally 
recognized picture identification card that contains the name and 
signature of the applicant.”39 If a registered voter does not have a 
photo identification that meets the legal requirements, he or she is 
allowed to vote but first must swear by affidavit to his or her identity 
and lack of identification.40 After completing the affidavit, the voter 
is allowed to vote.41 The ballot is not conditioned on any further 
action.42 It is cast and counted just like any other ballot cast in that 
election.  
D. Strict Photo Identification  
The fourth category of voter identification requirements, a strict 
photo identification law, is different from the third category in one 
clear way—a voter who does not have a photo identification on 
election day is required to return at a later date and provide one 
before his or her provisional ballot is counted. For example, to vote 
at the polls in accordance with Indiana’s strict voter identification 
law, a voter is required to produce “proof of identification”43 by 
showing a document issued by Indiana or the United States that has 
not expired and contains his or her name and a photograph.44 If the 
name on the provided identification matches the precinct register 
and the would-be voter matches the photo, then the person is 
allowed to vote.45 If, however, the voter is “unable or declines to 
present the proof of identification,” the voter must fill out an 
affidavit46 to receive a provisional ballot.47 This is where the key 
                                                                                                             
 37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:562(A)(1) (2009).  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. § 18:562(A)(2). 
 40. Id. The 2012 revision to Louisiana’s Election Code now requires the voter 
to swear to additional information contained in the voter registry such as date of 
birth. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1 (Westlaw 2014). 
 44. Id. § 3-5-2-40.5.  
 45. Id. § 3-11-8-25.1. 
 46. Id. § 3-11-8-23. In the affidavit the affiant must swear to U.S. citizenship, 
date of birth, residency, name, that he or she will not be voting in another precinct 
for that election, occupation, address, and to the understanding that lying in an 
affidavit is a punishable crime. Id. Louisiana’s affidavit only requires the voter to 
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difference from the previous statutory scheme lies—the provisional 
ballot will only be counted if the voter returns to the registrar’s 
office within ten days of the election and satisfies the identification 
requirement.48 This law ensures that, by and large, all votes cast on 
election day are cast by a registered voter and not an imposter. This 
scheme clearly provides more protection against in-person voter 
fraud than the other types of laws but also places the most burdens 
on the voter.49  
II. STATE’S INTEREST IN REFORM 
This Part looks to two important factors in determining whether 
a state’s concern over voter fraud is warranted. First, this Part 
examines whether voter fraud exists at all and, if so, whether photo 
identification requirements would help solve this problem. Second, 
this Part will explore federal legislation on voter registration and 
how it has made voter fraud easier to accomplish. 
A. Does Voter Fraud Exist? 
Since the time of the colonies, Americans have gone to the polls 
to vote.50 Even in the early days of this nation, poll workers 
attempted to protect this right from voter fraud.51 This led many 
colonies to follow in the British tradition of recording votes by 
voice, which included recognizing an elector by name in front of 
neighbors and friends with the belief that the voter’s identity was 
confirmed by the onlookers.52 This tradition of declaring one’s 
identity out loud “in the presence and view of the bystanders” is a 
tradition that continues today in many states, including Louisiana.53 
However, while this practice was once effective in small 
communities, it is no longer the failsafe it once was.54 
                                                                                                             
 
swear to date of birth and mother’s maiden name. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18:562(A)(2). 
 47. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1. 
 48. Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5. 
 49. Langholz, supra note 14, at 744. 
 50. Ed Crews, Voting in Early America, COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG (Sept. 15, 
2011, 6:26 PM), http://www.history.org/foundation/journal/spring07/elections.cfm 
[http://perma.cc/3G22-RD8Y] (archived Apr. 5, 2014).  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:562 (2009). See infra Part I.A.  
 54. COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. 
ELECTIONS 18–19 (2005) [hereinafter BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS], 
available at www1.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf [http://perma.cc 
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Many claim there is no need for voter identification laws 
because there is no evidence of voter fraud, pointing to the absence 
of criminal prosecutions as evidence of this assertion.55 But one 
does not need to look too far to find evidence of voter fraud all 
around. A close look at U.S. history provides striking examples of 
the problem, including a successful 14-year conspiracy to commit 
massive, in-person voter fraud in Brooklyn, New York, in the 1970s 
and ‘80s.56 A 1984 grand jury investigation in Illinois estimated that 
more than 100,000 fraudulent ballots were cast in one local election 
alone.57 And a more recent grand jury report found rampant 
absentee ballot fraud in Miami, Florida.58 While determining the 
exact magnitude of voter fraud is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, there is no doubt that voter fraud occurs.59  
In-person voter fraud can take many forms, such as felons and 
non-U.S. citizens voting.60 Another form that voter fraud can take is 
voter impersonation.61 This occurs when a person votes in the name 
of someone else, most likely either someone the person knows has 
recently moved out of the precinct or someone known to be dead.62 
Impersonation can also occur when a person registers fictitious 
names and then votes under those names, thus allowing one person 
                                                                                                             
 
/GB45-2YZ3] (archived Apr. 5, 2014) (confirming the Carter–Baker 
Commission’s assertion that “it is less likely that poll workers will be personally 
acquainted with voters” because the average precinct size has increased in the past 
century). 
 55. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 
2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (noting that plaintiffs used lack of voter fraud 
convictions as evidence that voter fraud does not exist).  
 56. In the Matter of Confidential Investigation, No. R84-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
June 23, 2011), available at http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads 
/1984_grand_jury_report-r84-11.pdf [http://perma.cc/43QP-LDER] (archived Apr. 
5, 2014) (detailing a 14-year conspiracy to “engage[] in various fraudulent and 
illegal practices designed to influence the outcome of elections”). 
 57. Publius, supra note 4, at 278 (discussing a 1984 federal grand jury 
investigation into the 1982 Illinois election estimating that “100,000 fraudulent 
votes had been cast” in the general election alone). 
 58. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY GRAND JURY, INTERIM REPORT, INQUIRY INTO 
ABSENTEE BALLOT VOTING (1998) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT OF MIAMI-DADE 
COUNTY GRAND JURY] (detailing “evidence of outright fraud in the absentee ballot 
process [that] called into question the legitimacy of two major elections” and a 
“concerted effort to influence absentee ballot votes of the elderly”).  
 59. BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at 18. 
 60. See generally HANS A. VON SPAKOVSKY, DEMOCRACY IN DANGER: CASE 
STUDIES OF ELECTION FRAUD 21–29 (2008), available at www.heritage.org 
/Research/LegalIssues/sr24.cfm [http://perma.cc/5784-DFZF] (archived Apr. 5, 
2014).  
 61. Id.  
 62. Langholz, supra note 14, at 736–37. 
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to vote numerous times.63 Another form of voter fraud occurs when 
a person registers in more than one precinct and votes in each.64 
These forms of voter fraud have been “enabled by the ‘honor 
system’ of voting prevalent in nearly all states until recent years”65 
and can be accomplished by individual voters or by concerted 
efforts of grassroots organizations.66  
Not all of these forms of in-person voter fraud can be solved by 
implementation of a voter identification law, but some certainly can. 
For example, ineligibility to vote due to felony conviction would not 
be detectable by simply showing photo identification. But given the 
logistics of getting an identification card, virtually all types of voter 
impersonation would be stopped. A person wishing to impersonate 
someone else would simply be unable to acquire an identification 
that has his or her picture with the name and address of the neighbor 
or fictitious person that he or she fraudulently registered. Thus, 
requiring photo identification virtually halts this form of voter 
fraud.67 
Without the help of photo identification, detecting and 
prosecuting voter fraud can be very difficult.68 Imagine the 
following scenario. A person attempting to cast a fraudulent vote 
“enters the polling place, gives a name that is not his own, votes, 
and leaves.”69 Finding this unnamed person later and linking him or 
her to the fraud can be next to impossible.70 But once the crime is 
committed, the real damage to the community is already done—the 
ballot has already been cast and disappeared anonymously into the 
ballot box.71 This simple fact coupled with the history of voter fraud 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. See also In the Matter of Confidential Investigation, No. R84-11 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. June 23, 2011), available at http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/up 
loads/1984_grand_jury_report-r84-11.pdf [http://perma.cc/43QP-LDER]  
(archived Apr. 5, 2014). 
 64. See Matthew Haye Brown, Democrat Withdraws from 1st District 
Congressional Race After Allegations She Voted in Two States, BALT. SUN (Sept. 
14, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-09-14/news/bs-md-wendy-rosen-
withdraws-20120910_1_general-election-voter-fraud-vote-on-local-issues [http: 
//perma.cc/4H22-XSC8] (archived Apr. 5, 2014).  
 65. Langholz, supra note 14, at 736–37.  
 66. Id. at 736. 
 67. Typical requirements for getting an identification card require proof of 
identity that would, in effect, prohibit any attempt at getting an identification card 
in the name of another. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.  
 68. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 
2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. The 2004 gubernatorial election in Washington state is a perfect example. 
Langholz, supra note 14, at 738. This race was decided by a 133-vote margin. Id. 
The court found over 1,600 fraudulently cast votes by felons, unregistered voters, 
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in the United States72 shows why a proactive attempt to prevent 
voter fraud from happening in the first place is so important.73  
B. Effects of Voter Fraud on the Electorate 
Some of the harmful effects of voter fraud are obvious; for 
example, voter fraud clearly subverts the legitimacy of competitive, 
closely fought elections.74 But there are also more insidious effects 
of voter fraud, such as undermining the confidence that Americans 
have in their electoral system as a whole.75 Voters may very well be 
driven out of the electoral process if they “fear their votes will be 
outweighed by fraudulent ones.”76 Further, a lack of confidence in 
the legitimacy of elections breeds distrust in the government and 
elected officials.77 After tens of thousands of votes had to be 
recounted in the presidential election of 2000, there was a sharp 
decline in confidence in the electoral system.78 This declining 
confidence in the electoral process and the almost complete failure 
of electoral administration in Florida was the catalyst for the 
formation of two national commissions on federal election reform.79 
The first was headed by former presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald 
Ford (Carter–Ford Commission) and the second by Jimmy Carter 
and former Secretary of State James Baker (Carter–Baker 
                                                                                                             
 
deceased voters, or people who voted more than once. Id. But the election was 
upheld “since there was no way to prove for whom the illegal votes were cast.” Id. 
 72. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Langholz, supra note 14, at 738; In re Request for Advisory Op. 
Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 458 (Mich. 2007). 
 74. INTERIM REPORT OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra note 58 
(“[E]vidence of outright fraud in the absentee balloting process called into 
question the legitimacy of two major elections.”). 
 75. BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at 18 (“The 
electoral system cannot inspire public confidence if no safeguards exist to deter or 
detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters.”).  
 76. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006). 
 77. Id. 
 78. THE NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND 
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 17 (2001), available at http://tcf.org 
/publications/pdfs/pb246/99_full_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/3W3F-ZJ3X] 
(archived Apr. 5, 2014) (stating that confidence that the electoral process was “at 
least somewhat fair” fell from 75% after the 1996 election to 50% after the 2000 
election). 
 79. The Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford Commission (Carter–Ford 
Commission) was formed in 2001 in direct response to the 2000 election. Id. at 32. 
The Jimmy Carter and James Baker Commission (Carter–Baker Commission) was 
formed in 2005 to finish the job left undone by the Carter–Ford Commission. 
BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at ii. 
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Commission). The Carter–Baker Commission’s express mission 
was to “recommend ways to raise confidence in the electoral 
system.”80 This commission found that few things could “undermine 
democracy more than a widespread belief among the people that 
elections are neither fair nor legitimate.”81  
C. How Federal Legislation Has Unintentionally Enabled Voter 
Fraud 
The first real federal foray into voter registration was the 
enactment of the National Voting Rights Act of 1993, commonly 
called the “Motor Voter Law.”82 This law had a twofold effect on 
state voter registration rolls. First, it required state driver’s license 
applications to also serve as voter registration applications, thus 
expanding voter registration outlets and voter registration rolls.83 
Second, the Motor Voter Law restricted states’ “ability to remove 
names from the lists of registered voters” due to inactivity.84 When 
taken together, these two provisions have inflated voter registration 
lists throughout the country by leaving ineligible voters on the 
rolls.85 For example, when a registered voter moves to a new 
precinct and registers to vote there, the Motor Voter Law requires 
that the voter’s name stay on the old precinct’s registration rolls 
unless he or she notifies that precinct “in person or in writing”86 or 
the State follows a lengthy procedure for removal that can take more 
than four years of voter inactivity and requires, among other things, 
notifying the voter by mail.87 
Years later, the Carter–Ford Commission attempted to solve the 
problems demonstrated in the 2000 election with the Help America 
Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).88 Most of the reforms in HAVA focused 
on state voter-registration efforts.89 Among other things, HAVA 
                                                                                                             
 80. BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at ii. 
 81. Id. at 1. 
 82. Langholz, supra note 14, at 745. 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–3 (2006). See also Crawford v. Marion Cnty. 
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 192 (2008). 
 84. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 192. States cannot remove a voter from the 
registration rolls for inactivity unless they follow the complicated procedure 
specified in 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–6(c) to (d). 
 85. A judge in Indiana estimated their rolls “were inflated by as much as 
41.4%.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 192. Whereas another study showed that in 2004 
“19 of 92 Indiana counties had registration totals exceeding 100%” of their voting 
age population. Id.  
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–6 (2006). 
 87. Id.  
 88. BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at ii. 
 89. Langholz, supra note 14, at 745. 
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imposed an identification requirement on those who registered to 
vote by mail, required the registrant to declare that he or she meets 
citizenship and age requirements, and required the states to maintain 
the accuracy of their registration rolls.90  
Both the Motor Voter Law and HAVA have had positive effects 
on voting in the United States. Motor Voter decreased the burden on 
voter registration by opening up new outlets, required “states to 
accept mail-in registration,” and eased the process for a voter to cast 
a ballot after moving to a new precinct.91 HAVA required states to 
modernize their registration roll and verify the identity and 
citizenship of new voters.92 But these positive effects were not 
without negative effects as well—most importantly, the laws created 
artificially bloated voter rolls. Since many states had to enact new 
legislation to comply with HAVA,93 they took that opportunity to 
fix the problems exposed in their states by the implementation of the 
Motor Voter Law. Because the states could not change the 
procedure for purging voter registration rolls, many turned to photo 
identification laws as the solution. 
III. FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
Non-strict and non-photo identification laws are rarely 
challenged on constitutional grounds. In almost every state where a 
strict voter identification law has been enacted, however, the law has 
been quickly greeted with legal challenges.94 Indiana’s law was no 
different. The law was passed in 2005 as part of Indiana’s 
comprehensive election reform that overhauled the State’s election 
code.95 A complaint was quickly filed in the Southern District of 
Indiana,96 and another suit followed in state court a few years later.97 
These two cases advanced separately to the Supreme Court of the 
United States and the Supreme Court of Indiana to answer different 
                                                                                                             
 90. Id. at 745. 
 91. Id. at 743–44. 
 92. Id. at 745–46. 
 93. “[F]orty-four states were not in compliance with the new limited voter-
identification requirement.” Id. at 747. 
 94. For example, Wisconsin’s Act 23 was enacted in the 2011 legislative 
session and challenged that very same year. See League of Women Voters of Wis. 
Educ. Network, Inc. v. Scott Walker, No. 11CV4669, 2012 WL 763586 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Mar. 12, 2012); Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v. Walker, No. 2012AP557–
LV, 2012 WL 1020254 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2012). 
 95. See Senate Enrolled Act No. 483, 2005 Ind. Acts 2005.  
 96. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 186 (2008). 
 97. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, No. 49D13–0806–PL-
027627, 2008 WL 7005824 (Ind. Super. Dec. 17, 2008).  
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constitutional questions.98 The federal case, Crawford v. Marion 
County, questioned whether the law was constitutional under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.99 The state case, 
League of Women Voters of Indiana v. Rokita, questioned whether 
the law was constitutional under the Indiana Constitution’s Voter 
Qualifications Clause and Equal Protection Clause.100 Thus, the 
Indiana law is the only law that has been tested under both the 
federal constitution and a state constitution.  
A brief overview of these two cases will give a full picture of 
factors to which courts have turned to determine whether a law 
meets the constitutional protections provided. In addition, there are 
many similarities between the protections provided under Indiana’s 
constitution and those provided under Louisiana’s. Therefore, a 
close look at the Indiana Supreme Court case will aid in the analysis 
of whether an Indiana-style law can be implemented in Louisiana.  
This Part focuses on the different tests employed in the two 
court systems for the relevant constitutional analysis. First, this Part 
overviews the balancing test used to evaluate a federal equal 
protection challenge to a voting regulation. Second, this Part 
explores the state constitutional concerns, including the right to vote 
under Indiana’s constitution and the two-pronged test used to 
evaluate equal protection challenges in Indiana. 
A. Federal Equal Protection Analysis: Balancing the Interest of the 
State with the Burden on the Voters 
The right to vote is not expressly guaranteed in the U.S. 
Constitution.101 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared it a 
fundamental right on which all other rights depend.102 Typically 
under federal jurisprudence, if a law burdening a fundamental right 
is challenged, the court must evaluate the law with the highest form 
of scrutiny available—strict scrutiny.103 In evaluating constitutional 
challenges to voting regulations, however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has declined to impose strict scrutiny unless the burden placed on 
                                                                                                             
 98. See Crawford, 553 U.S. 181; League of Women Voters of Ind. v. Rokita, 
929 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. 2010). 
 99. Crawford, 553 U.S. 181. 
 100. League of Women Voters of Ind., 929 N.E.2d 758. 
 101. Robertson, supra note 13, at 923 n.1. 
 102. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); 
Robertson, supra note 13, at 923 n.1. 
 103. Sibley v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1105 (La. 
1985). 
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voting constitutes a “severe restriction.”104 Because of the obvious 
need for government to regulate elections105 and the constitutional 
right to do so,106 the Supreme Court reasoned that “subject[ing] 
every voting regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the hands of 
States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and 
efficiently.”107  
Therefore, the Court developed a two-part balancing test to 
evaluate laws that burden the right to vote.108 Under this test, a court 
balances “the precise interests put forward by the state as 
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule”109 with the 
“character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights 
protected.”110 When balancing these factors, the court must focus on 
the “legitimacy and strength of each of those interests” and the 
“extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the 
plaintiff’s rights.”111  
1. Indiana’s Interest  
Indiana set forth three distinct interests in requiring voters to 
present a valid photo identification at the polls.112 They were: (1) a 
desire to modernize election procedures, (2) an interest in “deterring 
and detecting voter fraud,” and (3) an interest in “safeguarding voter 
                                                                                                             
 104. If voting is severely restricted, then the restriction “must be ‘narrowly 
drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’” Burdick v. Takushi, 
504 U.S. 428, 434–34 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 
(1992)). 
 105. “Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion 
that government must play an active role in structuring elections; ‘as a practical 
matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and 
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic 
processes.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 
(1974)). 
 106. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but 
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to 
the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 107. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. 
 108. This test was first introduced in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 
789 (1983). However, the Court in Crawford notes that this test is consistent with 
cases decided prior to Anderson, including the 1966 case, Harper v. Virginia 
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 
553 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2008). 
 109. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191. 
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confidence.”113 The U.S. Supreme Court held all three interests to be 
valid concerns that could warrant appropriate regulation.114  
In evaluating the State’s interest in modernizing election 
procedures, the Court pointed specifically to the effects that the 
Motor Voter Law and HAVA have had on voter registration across 
the country.115 The salient point that the Court relied on included the 
restrictions that the Motor Voter Law has imposed on states for the 
removal of inactive voters from the rolls, holding the law to be at 
least “partly responsible for inflated lists of registered voters.”116 
The Court also took particular notice of the fact that HAVA itself 
imposed an identification requirement on newly registered voters 
and that HAVA and the Motor Voter Law both “indicate that 
Congress believes that photo identification is one effective method 
of establishing a voter’s qualification to vote and that the integrity of 
elections is enhanced through improved technology.”117 
Moving on to Indiana’s declared interest in deterring and 
detecting voter fraud, the Court began by noting that the State did 
not provide any evidence of actual fraud in Indiana.118 However, the 
Court found Indiana’s interest to be reasonable for two reasons.119 
First, the Court noted sufficient historical documentation of voter 
fraud in the United States, including not only recent examples of 
fraud but also recent examples of fraud in Indiana.120 Based upon 
this evidence, the Court unequivocally stated that “the risk of voter 
fraud [is] real [and] that it could affect the outcome of a close 
election.”121 Second, the Court stated that an interest in the “orderly 
administration [of elections] and accurate record keeping” alone 
“provides sufficient justification for carefully identifying all voters 
participating in the election process.”122 When coupled with the 
bloated voter rolls due in part to the Motor Voter Law, the Court 
found that Indiana had proven a “nondiscriminatory reason for 
supporting the . . . decision to require photo identification.”123 
The final interest put forth by Indiana, safeguarding public 
confidence in the electoral system, is strongly related to deterring 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 192–94. 
 116. Id. at 192 (pointing to the record that shows that “as of 2004 Indiana’s 
voter rolls were inflated by as much as 41.4%”). 
 117. Id. at 193. 
 118. Id. at 194. 
 119. Id. at 195–96. 
 120. Id. (noting absentee ballot fraud in the 2003 Democratic primary election 
in East Chicago, Indiana). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 196. 
 123. Id. at 196–97. 
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and detecting voter fraud.124 The Court stressed, however, that it has 
“independent significance, because it encourages citizen 
participation in the democratic process.”125 Overall, the Court found 
that Indiana had sufficient interests to burden voters with the 
requirement of showing a photo identification when voting in person 
at the polls.126 This interest must be weighed against the burden 
placed on the voters and must be “sufficiently weighty to justify the 
limitation” in order to uphold the law.127 
2. Character and Magnitude of the Injury to the Right to Equal 
Protection 
After having established that Indiana was justified in enacting a 
voter identification requirement, the Court then weighed the 
justification against the magnitude of the burden placed on the 
voters by requiring photo identification.128 First and foremost, the 
Court noted that “the inconvenience of going to the Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a 
photograph does not qualify as a substantial burden on most voters’ 
right to vote, or represent a significant increase over the usual 
burdens of voting.”129 However, the Court recognized that a heavier 
burden might be placed on certain groups of voters who do not have 
identification, such as the elderly and the poor.130 Therefore, the 
Court looked specifically to the burden imposed on the small portion 
of the population that lack identification.131 
The Court was very clear that the challengers bore a heavy 
burden because they were seeking to fully invalidate the law.132 
They failed to meet this burden for a few reasons.133 First, the record 
did not include information that allowed the Court to quantify “the 
number of registered voters without photo identification.”134 Nor did 
they provide any testimony of a single citizen who “expressed a 
                                                                                                             
 124. Id. at 197. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 202. 
 127. Id. at 190 (quoting Norman v. Reed 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128. Id. at 197. 
 129. Id. at 198. 
 130. Id. at 198–99 (noting the burden might be higher on “elderly persons born 
out of state, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate,” the poor or 
disadvantaged who might have difficulty obtaining their birth certificate, the 
homeless, and those who object to being photographed for religious reasons). 
 131. Id. at 199. 
 132. Id. at 200. 
 133. Id. at 199–202. 
 134. Id. 
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personal inability to vote” under the Indiana law.135 Because the 
plaintiff could neither establish that the law had actually burdened 
anyone nor present a number of voters who might be burdened by 
the law, the Court determined the magnitude of the burden to be low 
at best.136 
Next, the Court pointed to four provisions of the law that 
mitigated the burden placed on those without identification.137 Most 
importantly, the Court recognized the ability to vote by provisional 
ballot.138 Voters who do not have identification on election day are 
not summarily turned away from the polls.139 Every person who 
claims the right to vote is, by law, allowed to cast a provisional 
ballot.140 Second, the Court recognized the ability for most voters to 
cast an absentee ballot for which photo identification is not 
required.141 Third, the Court noted that the indigent and those with 
religious objections to being photographed are allowed to vote by 
provisional ballot and then sign the appropriate affidavit at the 
clerk’s office within a week and a half of the election.142 Finally, the 
Court noted that anyone without valid photo identification is able to 
obtain free identification from the State.143 This answered the crucial 
question of whether the identification requirement was in fact a poll 
tax.144 Given all of the mitigating factors, the Court simply could not 
“conclude that the statute impose[d] ‘excessively burdensome 
requirements’ on any class of voters.”145  
Although this opinion was split with three justices concurring in 
judgment and two dissenting, the question of whether a strict photo 
identification requirement is valid under the federal constitution is 
settled for now. Because this was only a facial challenge to 
Indiana’s voter identification law, an individual voter who is 
disenfranchised by Indiana’s law can still directly challenge it,146 but 
                                                                                                             
 135. Id. at 201. 
 136. Id. at 202. 
 137. Id. at 199–202. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 199. 
 140. Id. In order to have a ballot counted, the voter would have to return to the 
appropriate county office and produce valid photo identification, but the time 
given for this allowed someone to get identification if he or she otherwise did not 
have one. Id.  
 141. Here, the Court specifically noted the ability of all elderly to vote by 
absentee without having to furnish a reason. Id. at 201. 
 142. Id. at 185. 
 143. Id. at 198. 
 144. Id. at 199. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) 
(“[W]ealth or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications.”).  
 145. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202. 
 146. Id. at 200. 
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given the mitigating factors of access to free identification, 
provisional balloting, absentee balloting, and accommodation of 
those with religious objections, it might be difficult to find a voter 
who truly does not fit an exception. Therefore, for now, the analysis 
of the constitutionality of photo identification laws turns mainly on 
each individual state’s constitutional protections.  
B. State Right to Vote Analysis: Regulations v. Qualifications 
This Part reviews the challenges to Indiana’s voter identification 
law under Indiana’s Constitution. While not expressly guaranteed in 
the U.S. Constitution,147 the right to vote is enumerated in most 
states’ constitutions, including Indiana’s.148 To qualify as a voter in 
Indiana, a person must meet three requirements: (1) be a citizen, (2) 
be at least 18 years old, and (3) have resided in the precinct where 
he or she wishes to vote for the 30 days immediately prior to the 
election.149 Therefore, citizenship, age, and residency are the only 
characteristics required for one to vote. Indiana’s Constitution also 
grants the Legislature the right to regulate the registration process 
and, thus, impose restrictions on voting.150 Nevertheless, it does not 
allow the Legislature to add new qualifications that a voter must 
meet to be eligible to vote.151 
In League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc. v. Rokita, the 
League challenged the same Indiana law challenged in Crawford but 
brought the suit in state court to review state constitutional claims.152 
The League claimed that requiring voters to possess and provide 
photo identification is a new voter qualification, not a mere voting 
regulation.153 They likened ownership of photo identification to 
ownership of property, which was repudiated in Indiana in 1890 as 
an unconstitutional qualification of voting.154 The Indiana Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 147. Langholz, supra note 14, at 767. 
 148. IND. CONST. art. II, § 2. See also LA. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 149. IND. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 150. Id. § 14(c). 
 151. Id. “The General Assembly shall provide for the registration of all persons 
entitled to vote.” Id.  
 152. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 763 
(Ind. 2010). 
 153. Id. 
 154. The Indiana Supreme Court struck down a law that required a voter who 
was absent from the state for more than six months to provide proof that he or she 
had been subject to taxation in the county during the absence. Morris v. Powell, 25 
N.E. 221 (Ind. 1890). This amounted to a requirement that the voter own taxable 
property in the county. Id. In other words, a voter did not qualify as having a right 
to vote under Indiana’s Constitution unless he or she owned property within the 
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Court disagreed, stating that requiring a voter to present a photo 
identification “is not in the nature of such a personal, individual 
characteristic or attribute [such as age, residency, or citizenship] but 
rather functions merely as an election regulation to verify the voter’s 
identity.”155 According to the court, requiring voters to produce a 
valid identification will only prove that they are complying with the 
“valid existing constitutional qualifications” of Indiana’s 
Constitution, not some “other extra-constitutional qualification to 
vote.”156  
Because Indiana’s Supreme Court found the law to be a voting 
regulation, the statute only needed to be uniform in its application 
and afford a reasonable opportunity to vote.157 The court found 
Indiana’s law to be uniform even though an identification is not 
required of those voting by absentee ballot or certain groups of 
people voting in person, such as the elderly who live in certain 
licensed care facilities and those with religious exceptions to being 
photographed.158 The court saw these exceptions as being no 
different from other accommodations that the Legislature provided, 
such as “absentee voting [or] early voting.”159 Next, the court was 
not persuaded that obtaining identification is an unreasonable 
burden, given that the Bureau of Motor Vehicles must issue a card 
to anyone who meets the requirements, offer assistance in obtaining 
the required documents, and make temporary identification cards 
available if there is trouble obtaining all of the necessary 
documents.160 
C. State Equal Protection Analysis: Classifications and Unequal 
Treatment 
Since the court found Indiana’s photo identification law to be a 
valid voter regulation, it then turned to the next inquiry—whether 
the law met Indiana’s constitutional protection of equal 
                                                                                                             
 
county. Id. This was a qualification beyond those set out in Indiana’s Constitution. 
Id. 
 155. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 767. The State drew 
the distinction that Morris was unconstitutional not because one had to provide 
documentation of his or her taxable status at the time of voting but because the 
voter was required to meet the additional qualification of property ownership. Id. 
 156. Id. at 765. 
 157. Id. at 767. 
 158. Id. at 767–68. 
 159. Id. at 768. 
 160. Id. 
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privileges.161 The Equal Privileges Clause under Indiana’s 
Constitution limits the State’s Legislature from enacting laws that 
privilege any citizen or group of citizens over another if those 
privileges are not available to all citizens of the state.162 In Collins v. 
Day, the Indiana Supreme Court set out a two-part test to determine 
if a law meets the Equal Privileges Clause.163 Unlike the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s differing levels of scrutiny for challenges to equal 
protection under the U.S. Constitution, Indiana’s test applies to all 
challenges to Indiana’s Equal Privileges Clause, regardless of the 
type of right infringed.164 The first prong of the test requires any 
unequal treatment to be “reasonably related to inherent 
characteristics [that] distinguish the unequally treated classes.”165 
The second prong requires the unequal treatment to “be uniformly 
applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated.”166 
The League contended that the voter identification law violated 
the Collins test in three ways.167 First, the distinction between in-
person and absentee voters “is not reasonably related to the inherent 
characteristics” that distinguish these groups.168 The group argued 
that this violated the first Collins prong.169 Next, the League 
contended that the differences among regular in-person voters and 
those in licensed care facilities were not reasonably related to the 
groups’ differences.170 The League maintained that this too violated 
the first Collins requirement.171 Finally, it contended that these 
distinctions were not equally available to all persons similarly 
situated, thus violating the second Collins prong.172  
The court quickly dismissed the first argument that “the photo 
identification requirement for in-person voters does not reasonably 
relate to the inherent differences between in-person voters and mail-
in absentee voters” by focusing on the practical differences between 
the classes.173 For in-person voters, the election official has the 
opportunity to look at the voter and identification side-by-side to 
                                                                                                             
 161. Id. at 769–73. 
 162. IND. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 163. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 769. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 770. Therefore, if someone treats blind people differently, the 
different treatment should be related to their blindness. Id.  
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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verify that the person matches the photo.174 This is not the case for 
absentee voters.175 While the court agreed with the League that 
absentee ballots might be more susceptible to fraud and, therefore, 
in need of more protection than in-person voting, the court made it 
clear that absentee ballots were not the issue in this case.176 Whether 
the law’s stated purpose of deterring and detecting voter fraud 
would be better served if applied to absentee ballots was not the 
question under Collins.177 The Collins test only required that the 
actual disparate treatment created by the law be “reasonably related 
to the inherent characteristics” of the groups.178 It does not matter if 
the purpose would be better served if applied to a different 
segment.179 
The next two challenges concerned the exception for senior 
citizens living in licensed care facilities.180 These voters are not 
required to provide photo identification for in-person voting if their 
facility is used as their polling place.181 Under the first Collins 
factor, the League claimed that this creates an unequal class of 
voting seniors, distinguishing between those who live in a licensed 
care facility and those who do not.182 Under the second Collins 
factor, the League claimed that this exception is not available to all 
senior citizens, whether or not they live in a licensed care facility, 
who might have difficulty obtaining photo identification.183 The 
court dismissed the first argument due to the “extremely small 
number of voters excluded from the photo identification 
requirement,” holding that this small exception was permitted under 
Indiana’s constitutional jurisprudence.184 Next, the Court answered 
the League’s final claim that the law is not available to all seniors 
similarly situated.185 Collins required that a strong deference be 
given to the Legislature.186 Here the Court saw “the possible 
absence of precise congruity in application to all voters” as worthy 
of the court’s deference “[g]iven the scope of the undertaking 
                                                                                                             
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 771. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 770. 
 178. Id. at 771. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. See IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1(e) (Westlaw 2014). 
 181. See § 3-11-8-25.1(e). 
 182. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 771. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 771–72 (citing Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236, 
240 (Ind. 2003), which held that the Legislature cannot “provide for every 
exceptional and imaginary case”). 
 185. Id. at 772. 
 186. Id. at 770. 
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embraced in the Voter ID Law’s efforts in enhancing the integrity of 
the electoral process.”187  
The preceding discussion demonstrates how one of the strictest 
voter identification laws in the country188 withstood challenges 
under two different constitutions.189 Ultimately, the Indiana 
Supreme Court dismissed the case without prejudice, leaving the 
door open for challenges by individual voters who are “unlawfully 
prevented from exercising the right to vote” under the law.190 A key 
component to the failure of both challenges was the lack of actual 
proof that the law had disenfranchised a qualified voter.191 Both 
courts also upheld the law because the challengers did not overcome 
the high burden necessary for the relief sought—invalidation of the 
entire law.192 Neither court was willing to go that far without actual 
evidence of disenfranchisement. 
IV. LOUISIANA’S CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Using Indiana’s law as a model and its challenges as a guide, 
this Part explores Louisiana’s constitutional jurisprudence to 
determine if Louisiana could implement a strict voter identification 
law like that of Indiana’s. Because the law was upheld under the 
federal constitution, the analysis will focus on its validity under the 
Louisiana Constitution.193 Much like Indiana, Louisiana’s 
Constitution grants its citizens the right to vote194 and establishes 
                                                                                                             
 187. Id. at 772. 
 188. Voter ID: State Requirements, supra note 6.  
 189. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 188–89 (2008); 
League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 760. 
 190. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 760. This differs 
from Scalia’s concurrence in Crawford, in which he stressed that individual 
impacts should not determine the constitutionality of election laws in order to give 
stability to the electoral process. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 191. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 201 (“The record includes depositions of two 
case managers . . . none of whom expressed a personal inability to vote . . . .”); 
League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 772 (“[T]his case presents 
only facial challenges to the constitutionality of the Voter ID Law . . . .”). 
 192. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200 (“Given the fact that petitioners . . . [are] 
seeking relief that would invalidate the statute in all its applications, they bear a 
heavy burden of persuasion.”); League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d 
at 771 (“The relief sought by the plaintiffs is that the entire Voter ID Law be 
declared unconstitutional, not the overturning of the special exception for voters 
living in state licensed care facilities that serve as precinct polling places on 
election day.”).  
 193. See Crawford, 553 U.S. 181. 
 194. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 10, art. XI, § 1. 
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equal protection of the laws.195 Therefore, just like in Indiana, any 
voter identification requirement must be held constitutional under 
each of these provisions.  
A. The Right to Vote in Louisiana: Article I, Section 10 and Article 
XI, Section 1 
The right to vote is shaped by two sections of the Louisiana 
Constitution. First, article I, section 10 grants all citizens the right to 
“register and vote” once they reach 18 years of age.196 Therefore, 
citizenship and age are the only two qualifications to vote in 
Louisiana, unlike Indiana, which also has a residency 
requirement.197 Section 10, adopted with the 1974 revision to the 
Louisiana Constitution, is a significant change from the previous 
constitutional provision.198 Prior to 1974, the Louisiana Constitution 
had “broad limitations on suffrage,” including literacy, character, 
and residency requirements.199 The current provision represents a 
                                                                                                             
 195. See id. art I, § 3. 
 196. Id. art. I, § 10.  
(A) Right to Vote. Every citizen of the state, upon reaching eighteen 
years of age, shall have the right to register and vote, except that this 
right may be suspended while a person is interdicted and judicially 
declared mentally incompetent or is under an order of imprisonment for 
conviction of a felony. 
(B) Disqualification. The following persons shall not be permitted to 
qualify as a candidate for elective public office or take public elective 
office or appointment of honor, trust, or profit in this state: 
(1) A person who has been convicted within this state of a felony and 
who has exhausted all legal remedies, or who has been convicted under 
the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any foreign 
government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state, 
would be a felony and who has exhausted all legal remedies and has not 
afterwards been pardoned either by the governor of this state or by the 
officer of the state, nation, government or country having such authority 
to pardon in the place where the person was convicted and sentenced. 
(2) A person actually under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a 
felony. 
(C) Exception. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph (B) of this 
Section, a person who desires to qualify as a candidate for or hold an 
elective office, who has been convicted of a felony and who has served 
his sentence, but has not been pardoned for such felony, shall be 
permitted to qualify as a candidate for or hold such office if the date of 
his qualifying for such office is more than fifteen years after the date of 
the completion of his original sentence. 
Id.  
 197. See IND. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 198. LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE 
GUIDE 33–34 (1991). 
 199. Id. at 34. See LA. CONST. art. VIII (repealed 1974).  
1250 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
“strong statement of a right to vote,” while also recognizing “the 
state’s power to require registration as a prerequisite to voting.”200 
The power to require registration, and therefore to regulate elections, 
is affirmed by article XI, section 1, which instructs the Legislature to 
enact an election code that “provide[s] for permanent registration of 
voters and for the conduct of all elections.”201  
As can be imagined, the strict voting limitations set out in 
Louisiana’s Constitution of 1921 were often challenged.202 Since the 
1974 revision, however, there have been a limited number of 
challenges, mostly centered on the rights of felons to vote and run 
for office, neither of which bear any relevance to the current 
question.203 Further, since the 1974 Constitution, there has not been 
a single constitutional challenge to a law adding a voter 
qualification.204 Because there is no Louisiana jurisprudence on 
which to base an analysis, it is helpful, although admittedly not 
determinative, to look to other jurisdictions that have faced the same 
question and have constitutional provisions similar to Louisiana. 
Both Georgia and Indiana have faced the question of whether a 
photo identification requirement was, in fact, a new voting 
qualification, rather than a valid voting regulation.205 Also, both 
Georgia and Indiana have very similar constitutional provisions 
granting a broad right to vote.206 Therefore, their courts’ analyses 
                                                                                                             
 200. HARGRAVE, supra note 198, at 44. 
 201. “Section 1. The legislature shall adopt an election code which shall 
provide for permanent registration of voters and for the conduct of all elections.” 
LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. This is similar to Indiana’s provision that requires the 
Legislature to “provide for the registration of all persons entitled to vote.” IND. 
CONST. art. II, § 14. 
 202. See Hall v. Godchaux, 90 So. 145 (La. 1921) (defining an “actual bona 
fide resident”); United States v. State of La., 265 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1966) 
aff’d sub nom. Louisiana v. United States, 386 U.S. 270 (1967) (declared 
unconstitutional a law that denied help to those registering to vote who could not 
read); Trudeau v. Barnes, 65 F.2d 563, 563–64 (5th Cir. 1933) cert. denied, 290 
U.S. 659 (1933) (seeking to declare Louisiana’s Understanding Clause of the 1921 
Constitution to violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).  
 203. See, e.g., Malone v. Tubbs, 825 So. 2d 585 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (challenge 
to felons’ ability to run for public office).  
 204. Searching the notes of decisions on Westlaw resulted in no cases. 
 205. See League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758 
(Ind. 2010); Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67 (Ga. 2011). 
 206. The Indiana Constitution grants the right to vote to anyone who is a U.S. 
citizen, over the age of 18, who has been a resident of the precinct in which he or 
she wishes to vote for 30 days prior to the election. IND. CONST. art. II, § 2. The 
Georgia Constitution grants the right to vote to anyone who is a U.S. citizen, over 
the age of 18, who meets a residency requirement provided by the Legislature, so 
long as that person is not disenfranchised by later provisions of the Constitution. 
This article, like Louisiana’s provision, provides for the Legislature to regulate the 
registration of electors. GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, ¶ II.  
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can provide some guidance as to how this question should be 
answered by Louisiana courts.  
The Supreme Courts of both Georgia and Indiana held that 
requiring a voter to produce a valid identification for in-person voting 
was not a qualification because it did not amount to an inherent 
characteristic such as age and citizenship.207 An identification was 
merely a device to prove the person had met the qualification 
requirements set out in the respective constitutions.208 While 
Indiana’s court prescribed a “uniform and reasonable” test to evaluate 
voting regulations,209 Georgia’s did not.210 Georgia’s Supreme Court 
simply stated that “requiring an additional step in the voting process 
in order to validate identity is not unconstitutional.”211  
The Louisiana Constitution expressly grants the Legislature the 
right to regulate the registration of voters through an election 
code.212 It further expressly grants the Legislature the power to 
regulate the “conduct of all elections.”213 Proving a person’s identity 
by providing a valid identification falls within this power to regulate 
conduct. There is no direct jurisprudence to support an argument 
that this power is beyond the Legislature.214 Indeed, the Louisiana 
Constitution not only allows the Legislature to regulate elections—
article XI compels it to.215 Moreover, as Indiana’s Supreme Court 
noted, “[t]he fact that [people] prefer alternative procedures to the 
photo identification does not create a Constitutional violation in 
requiring” voters to provide one.216 Because the photo identification 
law poses no additional requirement, the only concern is whether it 
has an unduly disparate impact under the State’s equal protection 
analysis. 
                                                                                                             
 207. See League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d 758; Democratic 
Party of Ga., Inc., 707 S.E.2d 67.  
 208. See League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d 758; Democratic 
Party of Ga., Inc., 707 S.E.2d 67. 
 209. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 764. 
 210. Democratic Party of Ga., Inc., 707 S.E.2d at 73. 
 211. Id. 
 212. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 213. Id.  
 214. There is no jurisprudence on this issue since the ratification of the 1974 
Constitution of Louisiana.  
 215. “The legislature shall adopt an election code.” LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.  
 216. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 763 
(Ind. 2010). 
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B. Equal Protection in Louisiana: Article I, Section 3, The Right to 
Individual Dignity 
Equal protection is established in Louisiana under article I, 
section 3—the Right to Individual Dignity.217 Louisiana’s provision 
begins very similarly to the guarantee provided by the U.S. 
Constitution,218 but Louisiana’s provision goes beyond federal equal 
protection. First, it expressly abrogates laws that discriminate based 
on “race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations.”219 Further, it 
abrogates laws that discriminate based on “birth, age, sex, culture, 
physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations” if the law is 
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.220  
During the rehearing of Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of 
Louisiana State University, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
established the analysis for an equal protection challenge under the 
state constitution and outright rejected the federal weighing test.221 
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the federal analysis made it 
too difficult for the Legislature to predict the outcome of similar 
cases because the court was too “preoccupied with the abstractions 
of ‘fundamental right[s],’ ‘suspect classification[s],’ [and] ‘levels of 
scrutiny,’ . . . instead of focusing on an open analysis of the specific 
merits of the individual cases.”222  
Under the analysis set out in Sibley, the court must first look to 
the statute and repeal any law that discriminates on the basis of race 
or religion.223 If a law classifies based on “birth, age, sex, culture, 
physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations,” then the burden 
is on the “state or other advocate of the classification [to] show[] 
that the classification has a reasonable basis.”224 To do this, a 
                                                                                                             
 217. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.  
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall 
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, 
or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably 
discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical 
condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary 
servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for 
crime. 
Id. 
 218. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Equal Protection); LA. CONST. art. I, § 
3. Both articles prohibit the denial of “equal protection of the laws.” Id.; U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 219. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 220. Id.  
 221. Sibley v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1106 (La. 
1985). 
 222. Id. at 1106. 
 223. Id. at 1107. 
 224. Id. 
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defender of a law that creates such a distinction must prove the 
classification furthers a legitimate state interest.225 If a law 
discriminates on any other basis, the burden is shifted to the 
disadvantaged class to show “that [the law] does not suitably further 
any appropriate state interest.”226 A statute can discriminate 
expressly in the language used or effectively if the statute creates 
distinct groups of protected classes.227 Louisiana’s recognition of 
these two types of discrimination is explored in the following 
subparts.  
1. Threshold Question: Is There Discrimination Expressly on the 
Face of the Statute?  
Given Sibley’s single standard of scrutiny for equal protection 
analysis, the fact that voting is a fundamental right does not afford 
any additional analysis or heightened burden on either party.228 
Therefore, the threshold step of Sibley turns on the express language 
in the statute.229 On its face, a voter identification law like Indiana’s 
does not expressly create a distinction based on race or religion. 
Instead, this type of law expressly classifies people into two 
groups—those with photo identification and those without. Because 
these classes are not based on race or religion, a strict photo 
identification law would not be invalidated under the first hurdle of 
Louisiana’s Equal Protection Clause. Neither does this classification 
implicate the second standard enumerated in Sibley—classification 
based on “birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political 
ideas or affiliations.”230Again, the law only classifies voters based 
on whether they possess photo identification. Therefore, an Indiana-
style voter identification law falls to the third level of protection 
under Louisiana’s equal protection analysis for discrimination on 
another basis—namely whether someone has photo identification. 
Therefore, any challenge to the law requires a member of the 
                                                                                                             
 225. Id. at 1104. 
 226. Id. at 1107. 
 227. See Johnson v. State, 965 So. 2d 866, 872 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing 
the different burden a plaintiff has if the statute they complain of is facially neutral 
but discriminates in effect). 
 228. When discussing the problems with the U.S. Supreme Court’s three-tiered 
analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that “the Court’s opinions are 
preoccupied with the abstractions of ‘fundamental right,’ ‘suspect classification,’ 
‘levels of scrutiny,’ and the like, instead of focusing on an open analysis of the 
specific merits of the individual cases which would necessarily entail a balancing 
or comparative evaluation of government and individual interests.” Sibley, 477 So. 
2d at 1106. 
 229. See id. at 1107. 
 230. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
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disadvantaged class to prove there is no valid state interest in 
requiring in-person voters to present photo identification.  
The language of Sibley sets up two requirements for any legal 
challenge to be successful in Louisiana. First, a member of the 
disadvantaged class, a voter without photo identification, must bring 
the suit challenging implementation of a strict photo identification 
law in Louisiana. This could be a citizen who was unable to track 
down the required paperwork needed to obtain identification or 
someone too poor to afford the fees for acquiring a birth certificate 
needed to obtain identification. As seen in Crawford and in League 
of Women Voters, it is difficult to win a purely facial challenge to a 
strict photo identification law.231  
Second, the challenger must prove that there is no valid state 
interest in requiring in-person voters to present identification.232 
This inquiry mirrors the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis more than 
the Indiana Supreme Court’s.233 Proving no valid state interest is an 
extremely tough bar to overcome given the fact that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has already declared three valid state interests that 
could apply to every state in the union—modernizing the election 
system, deterring and detecting voter fraud, and boosting public 
confidence in the electoral system.234 All of these concerns can be 
shown in Louisiana. HAVA and the Motor Voter Law were national 
laws, and therefore the same problems that Indiana had in managing 
its registration rolls are present in Louisiana.235 Deterring and 
detecting voter fraud before it dilutes the weight of lawful votes is a 
valid interest of any state,236 and boosting public confidence in the 
                                                                                                             
 231. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 182 (2008); 
League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 772 (Ind. 2010). 
 232. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107. 
 233. Indiana’s equal protection analysis differs from the analysis under the 
U.S. Constitution and Louisiana’s. See supra Parts III.C, III.A.1–A.2.  
 234. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 181–82. 
 235. Louisiana Department of Motor Vehicle offices must act as registration 
outlets, and Louisiana’s Registrar of Voters must meet the same requirements as 
Indiana in removing inactive voters from their registration rolls. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 15511 (2006) (providing U.S. Attorney General with right to bring a civil action 
against “any State or jurisdiction” for declaratory and injunctive relief for 
violations of HAVA); see also id. § 1973gg(b)(2) (providing Congressional 
purpose of increased voter participation). 
 236. Louisiana has a “zero tolerance policy toward voter fraud.” Protect Your 
Vote: Elections Compliance Unit, LA. SECRETARY ST., available at http://www 
.sos.la.gov/ElectionsAndVoting/PublishedDocuments/ProtectYourVote.pdf [http: 
//perma.cc/WH46-MY98] (archived Apr. 5, 2014). The State’s interest in deterring 
and detecting voter fraud is also evidenced by the Secretary of State’s Election 
Compliance Unit and the Voter Fraud Hotline. See also Election Fraud and 
Compliance, LA. SECRETARY ST., available at http://www.sos.la.gov/Elections 
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electoral process is crucial throughout the United States because 
“[l]ittle can undermine democracy more than a widespread belief 
among the people that elections are neither fair nor legitimate.”237 
2. Secondary Question: Is There a Discriminatory Effect, and Is 
It Recognized by Louisiana’s Jurisprudence? 
Because an Indiana-style law does not expressly discriminate on 
any of the enumerated bases in article XI, section 3 of the Louisiana 
Constitution, potential plaintiffs would have difficulty convincing a 
court that the State has no valid interest in requiring in-person voters 
to present photo identification. Therefore, the plaintiff might attempt 
to argue that while an Indiana-style law does not expressly 
discriminate on one of the bases set out in the Louisiana 
Constitution, it does so in effect.  
This argument would be difficult for a challenger to mount. 
Under Sibley, the basis for classification is determined by looking at 
the “primary cause of [a person] being assigned to one of the two 
classes.”238 The primary cause in this case is whether the voter has 
photo identification.239 Louisiana courts have held that to recognize 
a discriminatory effect that was not the primary cause for 
classification as recognized in Sibley, it must be shown that the 
Legislature in some way desired that effect.240 Therefore, a 
challenger would have to show that, while the law does not 
expressly discriminate against these protected classes, it does so in 
reality and the Legislature “selected or reaffirmed a particular course 
of conduct at least in part because of, and not merely in spite of, its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”241 It is not enough that a 
statute has a discriminatory effect once put into practice; the 
discriminatory effect “must be traced to a discriminatory purpose to 
support a claim that a statute is unconstitutional under the [E]qual 
[P]rotection [C]lause.”242 
                                                                                                             
 
AndVoting/GetInvolved/ReportElectionFraud/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc 
/VCB-9WAW] (archived Apr. 5, 2014). 
 237. BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at 1. The 
Carter–Baker Commission was “formed to recommend ways to raise confidence 
in the electoral system.” Id. at ii. 
 238. Sibley v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1108–09 (La. 
1985). 
 239. See Id. 
 240. Johnson v. State, 965 So. 2d 866, 872 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
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Therefore, to prove the statute has a discriminatory effect would 
require showing that eligible voters who do not have valid photo 
identification are, in fact, members of a protected class and that the 
law was enacted purposefully to discriminate against the class.243 
The purposefulness component requires the Legislature to know that 
a certain class of people would be discriminated against and to have 
enacted the legislation with that intent.244 Once intentional 
discrimination is established in fact, the court would follow the same 
analysis as above: If the law is found to discriminate purposefully in 
its effect based on race or religion, then the law would be 
unconstitutional.245 Further, if the law is found to purposefully 
discriminate based on “birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or 
political ideas or affiliations,” the State would have the burden of 
proving a valid state interest for the discrimination.246 In this case, it 
would likely be struck down as well because there is no valid state 
interest in discriminating against a voter for any of the listed 
reasons. The bar for overturning a law based on a discriminatory 
effect is high. But this avenue seems likely to be the most fruitful 
approach in having a voter identification law declared 
unconstitutional. However, given the difficulty in showing that the 
Legislature intended to disadvantage a distinct class of voters, this 
attack on a strict photo identification law would likely fail.  
V. GOING FORWARD: SHAPING LEGISLATION 
Replacing Louisiana’s current non-strict photo identification law 
with an Indiana-style strict photo identification law would likely 
survive a challenge under the Louisiana Constitution.247 However, a 
poorly constructed law that ignores principles of Crawford and 
League of Women Voters would almost certainly fail to pass 
constitutional muster. Both courts took note of factors that help 
create a balanced law and mitigate the burden on voters and risk of 
disenfranchisement. In light of recent cases in other states, the 
Legislature should pay particular attention to the implementation 
                                                                                                             
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; Sibley v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 477 
So. 2d 1094, 1107 (La. 1985). “When the law classifies individuals by race or 
religious beliefs, it shall be repudiated completely.” Id. 
 246. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107. “When the statute 
classifies persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or 
political ideas or affiliations, its enforcement shall be refused unless the state or 
other advocate of the classification shows that the classification has a reasonable 
basis.” Id. 
 247. See supra Part IV. 
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timeline and how it coincides with major elections.248 Factors that 
mitigate the burden on voters and a thoughtful implementation 
timeline are the two most important concerns to incorporate in any 
law passed in Louisiana.249  
Because the Supreme Court noted that “gathering the required 
documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a 
substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a 
significant increase over the usual burdens of voting,” the most 
obvious mitigating factor in Indiana’s law is therefore the 
availability of a free photo identification.250 Currently, a Louisiana 
identification can cost anywhere from $3 to $10 depending on one’s 
age.251 However, in Louisiana, a person can get an identification 
card for free if they are a registered voter.252 Therefore, any concern 
that obtaining identification would amount to a poll tax is already 
mitigated under current Louisiana law. To get photo identification in 
Louisiana, one must follow the same procedures as for a driver’s 
license.253 This means that one must prove his or her identity by 
bringing in two primary forms of identification, or one primary and 
two secondary forms.254 These are the same requirements to obtain 
photo identification in Indiana.255 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted 
in Crawford, obtaining certain forms of primary identification, such 
as a certified copy of a birth certificate, costs money.256 In upholding 
the Indiana law, the Court allowed a fee range of $3 to $12.257 An 
appropriate form of identification can be purchased within this range 
in Louisiana as well.258 Therefore, the mitigating factor of a free 
identification is already in place in Louisiana. 
The importance of making a provisional ballot available on 
election day and a procedure to have that ballot counted if the 
                                                                                                             
 248. See Applewhite v. Com., No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *3 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (analyzing implementation in upcoming election); 
South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50 (D.D.C. 2012) (deciding 
whether to “pre-clear” the South Carolina voting law under the Voting Rights 
Act). 
 249. An example would be the challenge to the exception in Indiana for those 
living in licensed care facilities. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 
929 N.E.2d 758, 771 (Ind. 2010). 
 250. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008). 
 251. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1321(D) (Supp. 2014). 
 252. Id. § 40:1321(C)(1). 
 253. Id. § 40:1321(A). 
 254. Id. § 32:409.1(A)(2)(d)(x). A primary form of identification is a document 
such as a certified copy of a birth certificate, a certificate of citizenship, a military 
identification, etc. Id. 
 255. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 n.17. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:40 (2002). 
1258 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
voter’s identity is later proven to the registrar cannot be underscored 
enough and should be included in a law enacted in Louisiana. 
Although the availability of provisional ballots was seen by Justice 
Scalia as merely “an indulgence—not a constitutional 
imperative,”259 it does prevent a substantial number of everyday 
circumstances from disenfranchising a lawful voter, such as 
forgetting identification, having a wallet stolen days before an 
election, or forgetting to renew one’s driver’s license.260 None of 
these factors should preclude a voter from casting a ballot, and 
Louisiana should make certain that there is a provision in place to 
account for “life’s vagaries.”261 Because one can obtain an 
identification card in Louisiana in one day, a ten-day grace period to 
return to the registrar’s office with a valid identification after 
election day is sufficient and recommended. 
Another mitigating factor briefly discussed in Crawford is the 
ability to cast an absentee ballot instead of voting in person.262 Some 
states, such as Georgia, allow anyone to vote by absentee ballot.263 
The voter does not need to give a specific reason for requesting an 
absentee ballot, such as being out of town on election day.264 
Indiana, however, requires a voter to give a reason to vote by 
absentee, but the State allows the elderly and disabled to vote by 
absentee ballot without a reason.265 In Louisiana, one must provide 
sufficient reason to cast an absentee ballot.266 Reasons such as 
expecting to be temporarily out of the parish on election day for 
vacation or work, attending or teaching school outside of the parish 
on election day, or being a member of the armed services serving 
outside of the parish are all valid reasons to cast an absentee 
ballot.267 Like Indiana, Louisiana also allows the elderly and 
disabled to cast absentee ballots without stating a reason.268 
Therefore, Louisiana already sufficiently reduces the burden on 
voters by allowing absentee balloting and, further, allowing certain 
vulnerable groups to vote by absentee ballot without meeting one of 
the criteria for ordinary citizens. 
There are a few other mitigating factors of which the Supreme 
Court of Indiana took notice that might be worth implementing in 
                                                                                                             
 259. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 209 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 260. Id. at 197. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 201. 
 263. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-381 (Westlaw 2014). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 240. 
 266. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1303 (2012). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
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Louisiana. First, the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles lists the 
documents necessary to obtain identification online.269 This practice 
reduces the number of return trips to and from the Bureau and thus 
reduces the burden on the voter.270 Louisiana also has a list of 
necessary documents available online; however, it is difficult to find 
and should be made more readily accessible.271 Indiana’s Bureau 
also has a “hotline” available to assist people in gathering the 
necessary documents.272 Further, the Bureau has the ability to grant 
exceptions or “use other verifiable documentation if an applicant is 
reasonably unable to gather the necessary documents,” and it has the 
ability to “issue an interim identification card to allow an individual 
to vote while the Bureau conducts its verification of the application 
for a permanent identification card.”273 All of these mitigating 
factors should be seriously considered by Louisiana’s Legislature 
when considering a strict voter identification law. 
One final factor that the Louisiana Legislature should strongly 
consider is the timing of the implementation. In recent years, at least 
two states’ courts have issued injunctions to halt implementation of 
a strict photo identification law.274 Neither injunction declared that 
the laws unconstitutionally burdened voters.275 Rather, the 
injunctions were handed down because there was simply not enough 
time to ensure implementation of the law before an upcoming 
federal election.276 A phase-in period was suggested in Justice 
Souter’s dissent in Crawford277 and recommended in the Carter–
Baker Report.278 While a timeline that attempted to rush 
implementation of a strict photo identification law will not keep a 
valid law from being implemented at some point, it could delay 
implementation of the law and cause unnecessary court challenges 
that a well-drafted piece of legislation could easily avoid. 
                                                                                                             
 269. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 768 
(Ind. 2010). 
 270. Id. 
 271. See Identification Cards, LA. OFF. MOTOR VEHICLES, http://dpsweb.dps 
.louisiana.gov/omv1.nsf/47c22a6b4cac67ec862570c90053bd7f/2be27793a2c96e8
3862564ae0054290f?OpenDocument&Highlight=2,identification,card (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2012) [http://perma.cc/M88E-46NL] (archived Apr. 5, 2014). 
 272. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 768. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Applewhite v. Com., No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 4497211 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012); South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 
(D.D.C. 2012). 
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In crafting legislation to replace Louisiana’s current non-strict 
photo identification law, the Legislature should take direct note of 
the factors included in Indiana’s law that helped mitigate the burden 
that the identification requirement posed on the voters. It should pay 
particular attention to the availability of provisional ballots and a 
thoughtful implementation timeline that allows for a full and fair 
implementation in advance of an upcoming election. By combining 
these provisions with current Louisiana laws that allow the elderly 
and other groups to vote by absentee ballot without stating a reason 
and the availability of a free voter identification card,279 Louisiana 
can sustain a strict photo identification law. And doing so would 
help ensure confidence in the State’s electoral process.  
CONCLUSION 
A movement to strengthen voter regulations has swept the 
country.280 As with most political issues, there are strong proponents 
and opponents. The Supreme Court of the United States found that 
requiring a photo identification to prove one’s identity before voting 
is a valid electoral regulation under the U.S. Constitution, given the 
strong interests of state governments and the small burden on voters. 
States have a valid interest in modernizing the electoral system, 
ensuring confidence in the electoral process, and deterring and 
detecting voter fraud. These interests are only made more urgent by 
the harm to the electoral process that can result once an illegal ballot 
disappears into those legally cast. The inability to later retract a 
fraudulent ballot is wholly different from making a lawful voter take 
the additional steps of casting a provisional ballot because the 
provisional ballot will in fact be counted and given the same weight 
as all other ballots once the voter takes the steps necessary to 
properly comply with the law. The laws that are sweeping through 
the states are withstanding state constitutional challenges because 
they provide the balance necessary to address this dual problem of 
disenfranchisement.281  
Given Louisiana’s constitutional protections and jurisprudence, 
a strong voter identification law enacted for the proper purpose of 
ensuring a fair and free election should withstand all constitutional 
challenges. Louisiana’s Constitution directs the Legislature to enact 
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an election code regulating voter registration and conduct and holds 
that if a voter meets the qualifications to vote set out in article I, that 
they have the right to register and vote.282 This registration 
requirement presupposes that there will be additional requirements 
that must be met before voting. So long as the Legislature includes 
commonsense and fair mitigating factors to avoid voter 
disenfranchisement, the State’s strong interest in protecting and 
ensuring a fair and free election will win out. Ultimately, a strong 
photo identification law ensures that voters will not lose one of their 
most fundamental rights—their right to participate in the greatest 
experiment of all, that of self-governing. 
 
Julia d’Hemecourt∗ 
  
                                                                                                             
 282. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 ∗ J.D./D.C.L., 2014, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
The author would like to thank Professors John Devlin and Christopher Tyson for 
their guidance throughout the writing of this piece, as well as her family and dear 
friends for their unwavering faith and support. 
 
